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W THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
In Propria Persona; ] 
vs. ; 
GARY DELAND, DIRECTOR, UTAH ] 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ] 
et al., ] 
Respondents/Appellees. ] 
\ SECOND M E N D E D 
) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
) Civil Case No. 860272 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW the Petitioner/Appellant, In Propria Persona, and re-
spectfully moves the above entitled Court to grant the addition of the 
Petitioner/Appellantfs Amended Supplemental Brief, filed herein, pur-
suant to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. That an appeal was filed by the Petitioner/Appellant in the 
above entitled Court on October 30, 1986. 
2. That the above named Petitioner/Appellant entered a plea of 
guilty before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, and was subsequently sentenc-
ed to the Utah State Prison for a minimum mandatory term of 10 years 
to life imprisonment. 
3. In a decision by the Utah State Supreme Court dated on June 
30, 1987, in State v. Gibbons, Case No. 860405, Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart wrote for the unanimous Court: 
FILED 
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"On this appeal, Gibbons claims his guilty plea was entered in 
violation of Utah Code ANN § 77-35-11 (1982 & Supp. 1986) and his con-
stitutional right to due process under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969) . . ." 
II 
"Because our remand of the case will call in question before the 
trial court the validity of defendant's pleas under Boykin v. Alabama, 
supra, and Rule 11(e) of our rules, a statement of law concerning the 
taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in this state is appropri-
ate. /Rule 11(e)(1 thru 6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
§ 77-35-11, then quoted (SEE ATTACHMENT)/ 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring 
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered. The basis for that duty is found in Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969), where the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 'What is at stake for an accused facing (punishment) de-
mands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing 
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding 
of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.' 
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Court stated 
that 'clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it 
constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense un-
less the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the 
charge against him, the first and most universally recognized require-
ment of due process'. Id. at 645 (quoting Smith v. 0'Grady, 312 U.S. 
329, 334 (1941). Futhermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the 
2 
defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the 
relationship of the law to the facts. In McCarthy v. United States, 
394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme Court, in construing Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 stated that the factual elements 
of the charges against the defendant must be explained in the taking 
of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those 
elements: 
(B)ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of 
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless 
the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation 
to the facts 
The Judge must determine 'that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indict-
ment or information or an offense included therein to which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty1 
There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the 
record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's under-
standing of the nature of the charge against him. 
Id. at 466, 467, 470 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted, emphasis 
in the original). 
3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 at the time McCarthy was decided stated: 
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the 
consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse 
to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a plea 
or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the 
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made 
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge 
and the consequence of the plea. If a court defendant 
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea 
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The Court 
shall not enter a judgement upon a plea of guilty unless 
it is satisfied that there is factual basis for the plea. 
3 
Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements for taking 
a guilty plea by using a written affidavit. However, the affidavits 
are not uniform throughout Utah,4 and trial judges often rely on de-
fense attorneys to inform their clients of the contents of the affid-
avit. In a concurring opinion in Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, Justice 
White wrote: 
(I)t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to 
be entered against a defendant solely on the consent of the 
defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our cases make absolutely 
clear that the choice to plead guilty must be the defendant's: 
it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his 
plea and what it is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, (1969); and it is on his admission that 
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest. 
Id. at 650. Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e) 
anc
* Boykin, the law places the burden of establishing compliance with 
those requirements on the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume 
that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand 
the contents of the affidavit. 
4. Indeed, the form included in the record in this case is inadequate, 
being nothing more than a form with boxes for the trial judge to check 
denoting 'The defendant acknowledges receiving a copy of the information 
and the same was read to him' (in this case the information was not read); 
'Defendant is advised of his/her rights; and 'Plea is determined to be 
voluntary. ' 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, but an 
affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process. A sufficient affidavit is one which is signed by 
the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge and 
which lists the names and degrees of the crimes charged. The affidavit 
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should contain both a statement of the elements of the offenses and 
a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish the elements of the 
crimes charged. The affidavit should clearly state the allowable 
punishment for the crimes charged and should not that multiple pun-
ishments for multiple crimes may be imposed consecutively. The aff-
idavit should list individually and specifically the rights waived 
by the entry of the guilty plea* The details of any plea bargain 
should be set forth in the affidavit, as well as a disclaimer con-
cerning any sentencing recommendations as required by Rule 11(e). 
Finally, the affidavit should disclose the defendant's ability to 
read and understand the English language, the absence of promises 
to induce the plea, and the defendant's competency. The trial judge 
.should then review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, 
question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and ful-
fill the other requirements imposed by i 77-35-11 on the record 
before accepting the guilty plea. If a court does not use an aff-
idavit, the requirements set forth above and in § 77-35-11 must still 
be followed-^and be on the record. 
This procedure may take additional time, but constitutional 
rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy. The 
procedure outlined is designed to assist trial judges in making the 
constitutionally required determination that the defendant's plea 
is truly knowing and voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at 
least facilitate swift disposition of, post-conviction attacks on 
the validity of guilty pleas because the trial judge will have pro-
duced a clearly adequate rrcord for review. 
We retain jurisdiction but remand for proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion." 
5 
WE CONCUR: Gordon Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
A copy of State v. Gibbons, Case No. 860405, June 30, 1987, 
Utah Supreme Court decision is also attached hereto for this Court's 
consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in conclusion of the facts as stated above in the 
Amended Supplemental Brief, the Petitioner/Appellant above named 
seeks the additional relief from the above entitled Court and pursuant 
to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Appellate Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED on this l^tL
 d a y of J u l y j 1 9 87. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
N ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c e ^ / 7 . tCCg^-^ 
FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN 
Petitioner/Appellant 
In Propria Persona 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Fredrick George Olsen, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Second Amended Supplemental Brief of Appellant will 
be delivered to the Attorney General's Office at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /£yt*<- day of July, 
1987. 
FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN, APPELLANT 
Delivered by ^/TXlL^lAJ^tL, syjlyy^^ this 
day of July, 1987. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 860405 
Plaintiff and Respondent, F I L E D 
June 30, 1987 
v. 
Bruce Gibbons, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
Attorneys: David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for Respondent 
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Appellant 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendant Bruce Gibbons appeals from convictions on 
two counts of sexual abuse of a child, second degree felonies, 
and one count of sodomy on a child, a first degree felony. 
Gibbons contends that the trial court failed to determine if 
the guilty plea he entered was made knowingly and voluntarily. 
Gibbons also challenges the constitutionality of the minimum 
mandatory sentencing scheme set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201 (1987). Because of the incompleteness of the 
procedure in the trial court, we remand for further proceed-
ings, but otherwise retain jurisdiction of the case for future 
action that may become necessary. 
After being charged with the crimes enumerated above 
and after waiving a preliminary hearing, Gibbons appeared with 
counsel for arraignment in district court and pleaded guilty as 
charged to all counts. The following exchange occurred at the 
arraignment: 
The Court: State vs. Gibbons. Bruce 
Gibbons; is that your correct name? 
The Defendant': Yes, sir. 
The Court: Mr. Hult is your attorney? 
Mr. Hult: Yes, your Honor. 
The Court: And have you received a copy 
of the information? 
Mr. Hult: We have. 
The Court: This is an information that 
alleges three counts. Count One sexual 
abuse of a child, a second degree felony, 
in Cache County, State of Utah, on or 
about January through June, 1985; Count 
two, sodomy on a child, a first degree 
felony, in Cache County, State of Utah, on 
or about June through September, 1985; and 
Count Three, sexual abuse of a child, in 
Cache County, a second degree felony, on 
or about March 8, 1986. 
As to those three counts have you made a 
determination as to your plea? 
Mr. Hult: Your Honor, there have been 
plea negotiations with regards to this. 
The negotiations consist of an agreement 
that no additional counts would be added 
and that the counts presently charged 
would not be upgraded in light of any 
additional information, and also an 
agreement that an undertaking of bail 
which we're filing with the court today 
would not be opposed. • . . 
The Court: [A]s to the information that I 
just read to you, as to those three 
counts, what is your plea? 
The Defendant: On all three counts it 
would be guilty. 
The district court judge then informed Gibbons of the 
penalties for each offense, advised him that the sentences 
could run consecutively or concurrently, and informed him of 
the rights that would be waived by the entry of a guilty plea, 
but did not inform him of the elements of the crimes charged. 
The following exchange then took place: 
The Court: I also have to determine if 
it's voluntary. Have there been any 
threats made against you that would induce 
you to plead guilty? 
The Defendant: No threats. 
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The Court: Have there been any promises 
as to what sentence [you would receive] 
from this court that would induce you to 
plead guilty? 
The Defendant: No. 
The Court: Are you doing this then of 
your own volition? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Your decision? 
The Defendant: My own decision. 
The Court: And this is after you've 
discussed it with your attorney? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: And after you've heard what I 
told you about your rights and the 
* possible consequences? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Okay, I'll accept it as a 
Voluntary plea. . . . 
On the basis of defendant's guilty pleas, and after a 
sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Gibbons to two terms 
of from one to fifteen years and one term having a minimum 
mandatory of fifteen years and a maximum of life. The trial 
judge ordered that the terms were to run consecutively. 
Gibbons has not moved to withdraw his guilty plea in 
the trial court; however, a timely notice of appeal was filed, 
and sometime thereafter, appellate counsel was substituted for 
Gibbons' trial counsel. 
I. 
On this appeal, Gibbons claims his guilty plea was 
entered in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1982 & 
Supp. 1986) and his constitutional right to due process under 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Because of unusual 
circumstances, including the changing of defense counsel 
during the pendency of the appeal, no motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea was ever filed in the trial court, and ordinarily, 
this Court will not entertain an issue first raised on appeal 
in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain error. 
State v, Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v. 
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Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). The State argues 
that we should decline to consider the guilty plea issue 
because it was not raised below. However, the statutory 
provision governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea, § 77-13-6 
(1982), sets no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw the 
plea.^ A motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, if successful, 
would render the appeal of the guilty pleas in this case moot; 
if the motion were unsuccessful, an appeal could then be 
taken, resulting in two appeals in the same case. To avoid 
this possibility and to eliminate the possibility of appeals 
from two different judgments in the same criminal case, we 
remand the case to enable defendant to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, and we also retain jurisdiction 
over*the case for any necessary future action.^ See generally 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). This disposition 
is also consonant with the policy of allowing trial judges to 
have the opportunity to address an alleged error. See State 
v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983). 
II. 
Because our remand of the case will call in question 
before the trial court the validity of defendant's pleas under 
Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and Rule 11(e) of our rules, a 
statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
§ 77-35-11, states in pertinent part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty or no contest and shall not 
accept such a plea until the court has 
made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has 
knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) states: "A plea of not 
guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A 
plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of court." 
2. Should defendant wish to pursue the appeal after the lower 
court proceedings, a new notice of appeal need not be filed. 
Defendant instead should notify this Court and supplement the 
record as required, and a new briefing schedule will be issued 
by the Clerk of the Court, if necessary. Our retention of 
jurisdiction also means that defendant's other issue 
concerning the constitutionality of the minimum mandatory 
sentencing scheme remains viable if it is not rendered moot by 
the new proceedings. 
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(2) That the plea is voluntarily 
made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination, to a jury trial 
and to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against him, 
and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may 
be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden 
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(fe) requirements 
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis 
for that duty is found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243-44 (1969), where the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands 
the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in 
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a 
full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." 
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the 
Court stated that "clearly the plea could not be voluntary in 
the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he 
committed the offense unless the defendant received 'real 
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first 
and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" 
Id, at 645 (quoting Smith v. 0'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 
(1941)). Furthermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the 
defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged 
and the relationship of the law to the facts. In McCarthy v. 
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United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme Court, in 
construing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,3 stated that the factual elements of the charges 
against the defendant must be explained in the taking of a 
guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those 
elements: 
[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of 
all of the elements of a formal criminal 
charge, it cannot be truly voluntary 
unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to 
the facts. . . . 
. . . The judge must determine "'that 
the conduct which the defendant admits 
constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense 
included therein to which the defendant 
has pleaded guilty." . . . . 
. . . There is no adequate substitute 
for demonstrating in the record at the 
time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge 
against him. 
Id. at 466, 467, 470 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted, 
emphasis in the original). 
3. Fed. R. Crira. P. 11 at the time McCarthy was decided 
stated: 
A defendant may plead not guilty# 
guilty or, with the consent of the court, 
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to 
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not 
accept such plea or a plea of nolo 
contendere without first addressing the 
defendant personally and determining that 
the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge 
and the consequences of the plea. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if the court 
refuses to acdept a plea of guilty or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the 
court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
The court shall not enter a judgment upon 
a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied 
that there is a factual basis for the 
plea. 
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Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements 
for taking a guilty plea by using a written affidavit. 
However, the affidavits are not uniform throughout Utah,4 and 
trial judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their 
clients of the contents of the affidavit* In a concurring 
opinion in Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, Justice White wrote: 
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a 
guilty plea to be entered against a 
defendant solely on the consent of the 
defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our cases 
make absolutely clear that the choice to 
plead guilty must be the defendant's: it 
is he who must be informed of the 
consequences of his plea and what it is 
that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, (1969); and it is 
on his admission that he is in fact guilty 
that his conviction will rest. 
Id. at 650. Because of the importance of compliance with 
Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the law places the burden of 
establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial 
judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys 
make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of 
the affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote 
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the starting 
point, not an end point, in the pleading process. A 
sufficient affidavit is one which is signed by the defendant, 
his attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge and which 
lists the names and the degrees of the crimes charged. The 
affidavit should contain both a statement of the elements of 
the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that 
establish the elements of the crimes charged. The affidavit 
should clearly state the allowable punishment for the crimes 
charged and should note that multiple punishments for multiple 
crimes may be imposed consecutively. The affidavit should 
list individually and specifically the rights waived by the 
entry of the guilty plea. The details of any plea bargain 
should be set forth in the affidavit, as well as a disclaimer 
concerning any sentencing recommendations as required by 
Rule 11(e).^ Finally, the affidavit should disclose the 
4. Indeed, the form included in the record in this case is 
inadequate, being nothing more than a form with boxes for the 
trial judge to check denoting "The defendant acknowledges 
receiving a copy of the information and the same was read to 
him" (in this case, the information was not read); "Defendant 
is advised of his/her rights"; and "Plea is determined to be 
voluntary." 
5. The final portion of Rule 11(e) provides: 
(continued on p. 8) 
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defendant's ability to read and understand the English 
language, the absence of promises to induce the plea, and the 
defendant's competency. The trial judge should then review 
the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question 
the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill 
the other requirements imposed by § 77-35-11 on the record 
before accepting the guilty plea. If a court does not use an 
affidavit, the requirements set forth above and in § 77-35-11 
must still be followed and be on the record. 
This procedure may take additional time, but 
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of 
judicial economy. The procedure outlined is designed to 
assist trial judges in making the constitutionally required 
determination that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at least facilitate 
swift disposition of, post-conviction attacks on the validity 
of'guilty pleas because the trial judge will have produced a 
clearly adequate record for review. 
We retain jurisdiction but remand for proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result. 
(footnote 5 continued) 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a 
plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shall 
be approved by the court. If recommenda-
tions as to .sentence are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
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